Complete Home & Office Legal Guide/Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO/stat/mpc/p101.asc

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/* The Model Penal code represents the best thinking on what a
criminal code should be, and, has been adopted in large parts by
New Jersey, Wisconsin and many other states have taken portions
of it to inform their statute writing. This is perhaps the most
influential source on criminal law, other than the US Supreme
Court.*/
MODEL PENAL CODE

1.01.  Title and Effective Date

    (1) This Act is called the Penal and Correctional Code and
may be cited as P.C.C.  It shall become effective on ___.

    (2) Except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4) of this
Section, the Code does not apply to offenses committed prior to
its effective date and prosecutions for such offenses shall be
governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that
purpose, as if this Code were not in force.  For the purposes of
this Section, an offense was committed prior to the effective
date of the Code if any of the elements of the offense occurred
prior thereto.

    (3) In any case pending on or after the effective date of
the Code, involving an offense committed prior to such date:

    (a) procedural provisions of the Code shall govern, insofar
as they are justly applicable and their application does not
introduce confusion or delay;

    (b) provisions of the Code according a defense or mitigation
shall apply, with the consent of the defendant;

    (c) the Court, with the consent of the defendant, may impose
sentence under the provisions of the Code applicable to the
offense and the offender.

(4) Provisions of the Code governing the treatment and the
release or discharge of prisoners, probationers and parolees
shall apply to persons under sentence for offenses committed
prior to the effective date of the Code, except that the minimum
or maximum period of their detention or supervision shall in no
case be increased.

1.02.  Purposes; Principles of Construction

    (1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the
definition of offenses are:

    (a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and
inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual
or public interests;

    (b) to subject to public control persons whose conduct
indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes;


    (c) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from
condemnation as criminal;

    (d) to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct
declared to constitute an offense;

    (e) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious
and minor offenses.

    (2) The general purposes of the provisions governing the
sentencing and treatment of offenders are:

    (a) to prevent the commission of offenses;

    (b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of
offenders;

    (c) to safeguard offenders against excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment;

    (d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that
may be imposed on conviction of an offense;

    (e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just
individualization in their treatment;

    (f) to define, coordinate and harmonize the powers, duties
and functions of the courts and of administrative officers and
agencies responsible for dealing with offenders;

    (g) to advance the use of generally accepted scientific
methods and knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of
offenders;

    (h) to integrate responsibility for the administration of
the correctional system in a State Department of Correction [or
other single department or agency].

    (3) The provisions of the Code shall be construed according
tot he fair import of their terms but when the language is
susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to
further the general purposes stated in this Section and the
special purposes of the particular provision involved.  The
discretionary powers conferred by the Code shall be exercised in
accordance with the criteria stated in the Code and, insofar as
such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes
stated in this Section.

1.03.  Territorial Applicability

    (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a person
may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense
committed by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which
he is legally accountable if:

    (a) either the conduct which is an element of the offense or
the result which is such an element occurs within this State; or

    (b) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under
the law of this State to constitute an attempt to commit an
offense within the State; or

    (c) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under
the law of this State to constitute a conspiracy to commit an
offense within the State and an overt act in furtherance of such
conspiracy occurs within the State; or

    (d) conduct occurring within the State establishes
complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or
conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction which
also is an offense under the law of this State; or

    (e) the offense consists of the omission to perform a legal
duty imposed by the law of this State with respect to domicile,
residence or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in
the State; or

    (f) the offense is based on a statute of this State which
expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct
bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this
State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is
likely to affect that interest.

    (2) Subsection (1) (a) does not apply when either causing a
specified result or a purpose to cause or danger of causing such
a result is an element of an offense and the result occurs or is
designed or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction where
the conduct charged would not constitute an offense, unless a
legislative purpose plainly appears to declare the conduct
criminal regardless of the place of the result.

    (3) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply when causing a
particular result is an element of an offense and the result is
caused by conduct occurring outside the State which would not
constitute an offense if the result had occurred there, unless
the actor purposely or knowingly caused the result within the
State.

    (4) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the
victim or the bodily impact causing death constitutes a "result,"
within the meaning of Subsection (1) (a) and if the body of a
homicide victim is found within the State, it is presumed that
such result occurred within the State.

    (5) This State includes the land and water and the air space
above such land and water with respect to which the State has
legislative jurisdiction.

1.04.  Classes of Crimes; Violations

    (1) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute
of this State, for which a sentence of [death or of] imprisonment
is authorized, constitutes a crime.  Crimes are classified as
felonies, misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors.

    (2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this Code
or if persons convicted thereof may be sentenced [to death or] to
imprisonment for a term which, apart from an extended term, is in
excess of one year.

    (3) A crime is a misdemeanor if it is so designated in this
Code or in a statute other than this Code enacted subsequent
thereto.

    (4) A crime is a petty misdemeanor if it is so designated in
this Code or in a statute other than this Code enacted subsequent
thereto or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code
which now provides that persons convicted thereof may be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of which the maximum is less
than one year.

    (5) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute
of this State constitutes a violation if it is so designated in
this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other
sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil
penalty is authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a
statute other than this Code which now provides that the offense
shall not constitute a crime.  A violation does not constitute a
crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any
disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a
criminal offense.

    (6) Any offense declared by law to constitute a crime,
without specification of the grade thereof or of the sentence
authorized upon conviction, is a misdemeanor.

    (7) An offense defined by any statute of this State other
than this Code shall be classified as provided in this Section
and the sentence that may be imposed upon conviction thereof
shall hereafter be governed by this Code.

1.05.  All Offenses Defined by Statute; Application of General
Provisions of the Code

    (1) No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime
or violation under this Code or another statute of this State.

    (2) The provisions of Part I of the Code are applicable to
offenses defined by other statutes, unless the Code otherwise
provides.

    (3) This Section does not affect the power of a court to
punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law
for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgement or decree.

1.06.  Time Limitations

    (1) A prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time.

    (2) Except as otherwise provided in this Section,
prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following
periods of limitation:

    (a) a prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be
commenced within six years after it is committed;

    (b) a prosecution for any other felony must be commenced
within three years after it is committed;

    (c) a prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within
two years after it is committed;

    (d) a prosecution for a petty misdemeanor or a violation
must be commenced within six months after it is committed.

    (3) If the period prescribed in Subsection (2) has expired,
a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:

    (a) any offense a material element of which is either fraud
or a breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after
discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who
has legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself
not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this provision
extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than
three years; and

    (b) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public
officer or employee at any time when the defendant is in public
office or employment or within two years thereafter, but in no
case shall this provision extend the period of limitation
otherwise applicable by more than three years.

    (4) An offense is committed either when every element
occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing
course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of
conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated.
Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.

    (5) A prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is
found [or an information filed] or when a warrant or other
process is issued, provided that such warrant or process is
executed without reasonable delay.

    (6) The period of limitation does not run:

    (a) during any time when the accused is continuously absent
from the State or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode
or work within the State, but in no case shall this provision
extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than
three years; or

    (b) during any time when a prosecution against the accused
for the same conduct is pending in this State.

1.07.  Method of Prosecution When Conduct Constitutes More Than
One Offense

    (1) Prosecution for Multiple Offenses; Limitation on
Convictions. When the same conduct of a defendant may establish
the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be
prosecuted for each such offense.  He may not, however, be
convicted of more than one offense if:

    (a) one offense is included in the other, as defined in
Subsection (4) of this Section; or

    (b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form
of preparation to commit the other; or

    (c) inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish
the commission of the offenses; or

    (d) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to
prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to
prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or

    (e) the offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct
and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless
the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute
separate offenses.

    (2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses.
Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal
episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate
prosecuting officer a the time of the commencement of the first
trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.

    (3) Authority of Court to Order Separate Trials. When a
defendant is charged with two or more offenses based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the Court, on
application of the prosecuting attorney or of the defendant, may
order any such charge to be tried separately, if it is satisfied
that justice so requires.
    (4) Conviction of Included Offense Permitted. A defendant
may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in
the indictment [or the information].  An offense is so included
when:

    (a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or

    (b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the
offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included
therein; or

    (c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,
property or public interest of a lesser kind of culpability
suffices to establish its commission.

    (5) Submission of Included Offense to Jury. The Court shall
not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.



1.08. When Prosecution Barred by Former Prosecution for the Same
Offense

    When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision
of the statutes and is based upon the same facts as a former
prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution under the
following circumstances:

    (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal.  There
is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not
guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.  A finding of
guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the
greater inclusive offense, although the conviction is
subsequently set aside.

    (2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the
information had been filed or the indictment found, by a final
order or judgement for the defendant, which has not been set
aside, reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition
that must be established for conviction of the offense.

    (3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction.  There
is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgement of
conviction which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of
guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of
supporting a judgement, or a plea of guilty accepted by the
Court.  In the latter two cases failure to enter judgement must
be for a reason other than a motion for the defendant.

    (4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated.
Except as provided in this Subsection, there is an improper
termination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons
not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first
witness is sworn but before verdict.  Termination under any of
the following circumstances is not improper:

    (a) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by
motion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the
termination.

    (b) The trial court finds that the termination is necessary
because:

    (1) it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in
conformity with law; or

    (2) there is a legal defect in the proceedings which would
make any judgement entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter
of law; or

    (3) prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes
it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to
either the defendant or the State; or

    (4) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or

    (5) false statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair
trial.



1.09.  When Prosecution Barred by Former Prosecution for
Different Offense

    Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based
on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under
the following circumstances:

    (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in Section 1.08 and the subsequent
prosecution is for:

    (a) any offense of which the defendant could have been
convicted on the first prosecution; or

    (b) any offense for which the defendant should have been
tried on the first prosecution under Section 1.07, unless the
Court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or

    (c) the same conduct, unless (i) the offense of which the
defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for
which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact
not required by the other and the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or
evil, or (ii) the second offense was not consummated when the
former trial began.

    (2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the
information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or
by a final order or judgement for the defendant which has not
been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final
order or judgement necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction
of the second offense.

    (3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as
improper termination is defined in Section 1.08, and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant
could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.



1.10.  Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction: When a Bar

    When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent
jurisdiction of this State and of the United States or another
State, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in this State under the following
circumstances:

    (1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in Section 1.08 and the subsequent
prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (a) the offense
of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and
the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires
proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining
each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially
different harm or evil or (b) the second offense was not
consummated when the former trial began; or

    (2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the
information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or
by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been
set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order
or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact which must be established for conviction of the
offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.



1.11.  Former Prosecution Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction or
When Fraudulently Procured by the Defendant

    A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of Sections
1.08, 1.09 and 1.10 under any of the following circumstances:

    (1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or

    (2) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant
without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and
with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise
be imposed; or

    (3) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of
conviction which was held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on a
writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis or similar process.



1.12.  Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; Affirmative Defenses;
Burden of Proving Fact When Not an Element of an Offense;
Presumptions

    (1) No person may be convicted on an offense unless each
element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In
the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is
assumed.

    (2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not:

    (a) require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless
and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or

    (b) apply to any defense which the Code or another statute
plainly requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of
evidence.

    (3) A ground of defense is affirmative, within the meaning
of Subsection (2) (a) of this Section, when:

    (a) it arises under a section of the Code which so provides;
or

    (b) it related to an offense defined by a statute other than
the Code and such statute so provides; or

    (c) it involves a matter of excuse or justification
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant on which he can
fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence.

    (4) When the application of the Code depends upon the
finding of a fact which is not an element of an offense, unless
the code otherwise provides:

    (a) the burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or
defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be
furthered if the finding should be made; and

    (b) the fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court
or jury, as the case may be.

    (5) When the Code establishes a presumption with respect to
any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the following
consequences:

    (a) when there is evidence of the facts which give rise to
the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
must be submitted to the jury, unless the Court is satisfied that
the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact; and


    (b) when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is
submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while the
presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the
facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of
the presumed fact.

    (6) A presumption not established by the Code or
inconsistent with it has the consequences otherwise accorded it
by law.



1.13.  General Definitions

    In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is
required:

    (1) "statute" includes the Constitution and a local law or
ordinance of a political subdivision of the State;

    (2) "act" or "action" means a bodily movement whether
voluntary or involuntary;

    (3) "voluntary" has the meaning specified in Section 2.01;

    (4) "omission" means a failure to act;

    (5) "conduct" means an action or omission and its
accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts
and omissions;

    (6) "actor" includes, where relevant, a person guilty of an
omission;

    (7) "acted" includes, where relevant, "omitted to act";

    (8) "person", "he" and "actor" include any natural person
and, where relevant, a corporation or an unincorporated
association;

    (9) "element of an offense" means (i) such conduct or (ii)
such attendant circumstances or (iii) such a result of conduct as

    (a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct
in the definition of the offense; or

    (b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or

    (c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct;
or

    (d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or


    (e) establishes jurisdiction or venue;

    (10) "material element of an offense" means an element that
does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations,
jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter similarly unconnected
with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence
of a justification or excuse for such conduct;

    (11) "purposely" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02
and equivalent terms such as "with purpose," "designed" or "with
design" have the same meaning;

    (12) "intentionally" or "with intent" means purposely;

    (13) "knowingly" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02
and equivalent terms such as "knowing" or "with knowledge" have
the same meaning;

    (14) "recklessly" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02
and equivalent terms such as "recklessness" or "with
recklessness" have the same meaning;

    (15) "negligently" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02
and equivalent terms such as "negligence" or "with negligence"
have the same meaning;

    (16) "reasonably believes" or "reasonable belief" designates
a belief which the actor is not reckless or negligent in holding.



ARTICLE 2

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY

2.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of
Liability; Possession as an Act

    (1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his
liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or
the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.

    (2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning
of this Section:

    (a) a reflex or convulsion;

    (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;

    (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic
suggestion;

    (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual.

    (3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be
based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:

    (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law
defining the offense; or

    (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed
by the law.

    (4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this
Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the
thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a
sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.



2.02  General Requirements of Culpability

    (1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability.  Except as provided
in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he
acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law
may require, with respect to each material element of the
offense.

    (2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.

    (a) Purposely.

    A person acts purposely with respect to a material element
of an offense when:

    (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a
result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result; and

    (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.

    (c) Knowingly.

    A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe int he actor's situation.

    (d) Negligently.


    A person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to
him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

    (3) Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided.  When
the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an
offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if
a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect
thereto.

    (4) Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All
Material Elements.  When the law defining an offense prescribes
the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements
thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements
of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.

    (5) Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge.
When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an
element of an offense, such element also is established if a
person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly.  When
recklessness suffices to establish an element also is established
if a person acts purposely or knowingly.  When acting knowingly
suffices to establish an element, such element also is
established if a person acts purposely.

    (6) Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose Is
Conditional.  When a particular purpose is an element of an
offense, the element is established although such purpose is
conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

    (7) Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High
Probability.  When knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established
if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence,
unless he actually believes that it does not exist.

    (8) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly.
A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied
if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements
of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements
appears.

    (9) Culpability as to Illegality of Conduct.  Neither
knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct
constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or
application of the law determining the elements of an offense.

    (10) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense.  When
the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense
is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, its
grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative
kind of culpability is established with respect to any material
element of the offense.

2.03 Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result' Divergence
Between Result Designed or Contemplated and Actual Result or
Between Probable and Actual Result

    (1) Conduct is the cause of a result when:

    (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question
would not have occurred; and

    (b) the relationship between the conduct and result
satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code
or by the law defining the offense.

    (2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result
is an element of an offense, the element is not established if
the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation
of the actor unless:

    (a) the actual result differs from that designed or
contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a
different person or different property is injured or affected or
that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been
more serious or more extensive than that caused; or

    (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or
harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.

    (3) When recklessly or negligently causing a particular
result is an element of an offense, the element is not
established if the actual result is not within the risk of which
the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he
should be aware unless:

    (a) the actual result differs from the probable result only
in the respect that a different person or different property is
injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would
have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or

    (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or
harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's
liability or on the gravity of his offense.

    (4) When causing a particular result is a material element
of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the
element is not established unless the actual result is a probable
consequence of the actor's conduct.



2.04.  Ignorance or Mistake

    (1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a
defense if:

    (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose,
knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to
establish a material element of the offense; or

    (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by
such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.

    (2) Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a
defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if
the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the
situation been as he supposed.  In such case, however, the
ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and
degree of the offense of which he would be guilty had the
situation been as he supposed.

    (3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an
offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon
such conduct when:

    (a) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is
not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise
reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or

    (b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official
statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or
erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a
judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative
order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation
of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility
for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law
defining the offense.

    (4) The defendant must prove a defense arising under
Subsection (3) of this Section by a preponderance of evidence.



2.05.  When Culpability Requirements Are Inapplicable to
Violations and to Offenses Defined by Other Statutes; Effect of
Absolute Liability in Reducing Grade of Offense to Violation

    (1) The requirements of culpability prescribed by Sections
2.01 and 2.02 do not apply to:

    (a) offenses which constitute violations, unless the
requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense
or the Court determines that its application is consistent with
effective enforcement of the law defining the offense; or

    (b) offenses defined by statutes other than the Code,
insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for
such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof
plainly appears.

    (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and
unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides:

    (a) when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any
material element of an offense defined by a statute other than
the Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the
offense constitutes a violation; and

    (b) although absolute liability is imposed by law with
respect to one or more of the material elements of an offense
defined by a statute other than the Code, the culpable commission
of the offense may be charged and proved, in which event
negligence with respect to such elements constitutes sufficient
culpability and the classification of the offense and the
sentence that may be imposed therefor upon conviction are
determined by Section 1.04 and Article 6 of the Code.



2.06.  Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity

    (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by
his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he
is legally accountable, or both.

    (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of
another person when:

    (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient
for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or
irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or

    (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other
person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or

    (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the
commission of the offense.

    (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the
commission of an offense if:

    (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he

    (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or

    (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in
planning or committing it; or

    (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the
offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or

    (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish
his complicity.

    (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an
accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts without
he kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that
is sufficient for the commission of the offense.

    (5) A person who is legally incapable of committing a
particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is
committed by the conduct of another person for which he is
legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with
the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.

    (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law
defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense
committed by another person if:

    (a) he is a victim of that offense; or

    (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably
incident to its commission; or

    (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of
the offense and

    (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of
the offense and

    (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities
or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the
offense.

    (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the
commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though
the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been
prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different
offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or
conviction or has been acquitted.



2.07.  Liability of Corporations, Unincorporated Associations and
Persons Acting, or Under a Duty to Act in Their Behalf


    (1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an
offense if:

    (a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by
a statute other than the Code in which a legislative purpose to
impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct
is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of
the corporation within the scope of his office or employment,
except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents
for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the
circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions
shall apply; or

    (b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations
by law; or

    (c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.

    (2) When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of
an offense, a legislative purpose to impose liability on a
corporation shall be assumed, unless the contrary plainly
appears.

    (3) An unincorporated association may be convicted of the
commission of an offense if:

    (a) the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code
which expressly provides for the liability of such an association
and the conduct is performed by an agent of the association
acting in behalf of the association within the scope of his
office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense
designates the agents for whose conduct the association is
accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable,
such provisions shall apply; or

    (b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on associations
by law.

    (4) As used in this Section:

    (a) "corporation" does not include an entity organized as or
by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental
program;

    (b) "agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee
or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or
association and, in case of an unincorporated association, a
member of such association;


    (c) "high managerial agent" means an officer of a
corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of
a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or
association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct
may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation
or association.

    (5) In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated
association for the commission or an offense included within the
terms of Subsection (1)(a) or Subsection (3)(a) of this Section,
other than an offense for which absolute liability has been
imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a
preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having
supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense
employed due diligence to prevent its commission.  This paragraph
shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the
legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.

    (6)(a) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he
performs or causes to be performed in the name of the corporation
or an unincorporated association or in its behalf to the same
extent as if it were performed in his own name or behalf.

    (b) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a
corporation or an unincorporated association, any agent of the
corporation or association having primary responsibility for the
discharge of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless
omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the
duty were imposed by law directly upon himself.



2.08.  Intoxication

    (1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section,
intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an
element of the offense.

    (2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense,
if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a
risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such
unawareness is immaterial.

    (3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental
disease within the meaning of Section 4.01.

    (4) Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced or (b) is
pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such
intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks
substantial